Embryogenesis Explained

Evgenii,
Thank you for your comments and questions!
(1) The possibility of double descriptions of simple agents using the language of physics/chemistry on one hand, versus semiotics, on the other hand, indeed raises an important question: “does the nature of a system depend on how we describe it?”. Is the system still semiotic if we apply the language of physics and chemistry for its description? I think that double descriptions are important because they can show the origin of a qualitatively new system.
(2) Double descriptions are not fully equivalent. Physical description captures the structure and short-term dynamics, whereas semiotic description captures long-term dynamics, evolution, goal-directed functions. So, in a way, theu are complementary.
(3) Functional information is a set of signs used by agent(s) to encode and control its functions.
(4) The simplest version of a free will is “useful variation”. In general, variation is detrimental in agents as it can disrupt functions. However, at a certain level of complexity agents can compensate bad consequences of variations. Then variations become useful as they allow agents to discover new resources and functions. Higher levels of free will exist in agents with mind who can classify and model objects. These agents can model variations in their activity before they act.
(5) On the relationships between mathematics and physicalism. I don’t believe in the Platinic existence of mathematical entities like numbers and Pi. I think it is better to consider them as TOOLS developed by intelligent agents. Mathematical tools are applied to ideal objects that exist in the minds of these agents. Mathematical tools can be communicated in the same way as we communicate other functional information. So is Pi in the mind of one person the same as Pi in the mind of another person? Pragmatism criterion is the following: the Pi is the same if it allows to solve the same set of problems with comparable efficiency and practical output.
(6) Ideas of pragmatism are not easy to understand. Also religion pushes people towards objectve idealism which in not compatible with pragmatism. But traditional pragmatism (e.g., James, Dewey) needs an update because it underestimates the role of logic. In my next lecture I will talk about the balance between utility and logic.

(1) Why it is possible to employ mathematics to describe the Universe when there were no intelligent agents yet?
Answer: because our models are designed for extrapolation in space and time. The World is real and have certain regularities, but agents may have different representations and models of the world. Then why our models work? Because agents keep and elaborate only those models that work.
(2) Free will then after all seems to be just an illusion.
Answer: Not all illusions are bad. Why not to use good illusions? Our difference is that you would like to know what the world really is (realism, objectivism), whereas I am interested in how to live in this world and pursue my goals (pragmatism, instrumentalism).

(1) “we must not take physical laws literally, they are then just models”.
Yes, fully agree!
(2) the statement “The World is real and have certain regularities” already contains pretty strong assumptions
Answer: This statement is supported by our ability to develop consistent models of the world that give us very reasonable predictions most of the time. Somebody may argue that the world is a virtual reality engineered by god or aliens. Although it is impossible to prove that reality is not virtual, our reality is highly consistent and generally does not show signs of personal conflict with potential “creators”. So we can take it as it is.
(3) Mathematics makes abstractions from our activities. For example, counting objects is based on a physical operation that includes picking an object from one pile and putting it into another. Although it works with pencils, it does not work with atoms or with bacteria which replicate faster than we can count. The notion of “energy” is based on our ability to replace one resource by another (in some proportion) and still achieve the same result/action. Abstract notions are meaningful only as far as we know how to interpret them in our activities. It is reasonable to assume that intelligent aliens can count objects because counting is important for advanced functions. Thus, they may have a similar core arithmetics to ours. However, math foundations and interpretations may appear entirely different.

Evgenii,
(1) I am not interested in “objective” ontology because there is no such ontology. Each ontology is a product and a tool of some agents. In your case, Pi existed within the ontology of those mathematicians but it was not transferred to other agents (outside). I fully agree that “a theory is not reduced to empirical data. Rather a theory organizes empirical data”.
(2) Where a theory come from?
Theories come from other theories in the same way as organisms come from other organisms. The question how first theories appear is similar to the question on the origin of life. But first we need to agree on the definition of “theory”. If theory=logic, or theory=ideal object then theories appeared long before humans. However, we may think of a theory as a model formulated and disseminated via language (i.e., tertiary modeling system), then we should look for the origin of theories within human species.